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INTRODUCTION
Many North Carolina politicians refer to the entirety of the state by
saying “from Manteo to Murphy.” 1 Manteo, North Carolina, is a small
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beach town on Roanoke Island on the eastern edge of the state, while
Murphy, North Carolina, is a similarly sized town in Cherokee County, the
state’s westernmost county. Including Manteo and Murphy, North Carolina
is home to 552 municipalities. 2 They range in size from Charlotte, with
over seven hundred thousand people, to Fontana Dam, with a population of
less than twenty-five.3 Together, these 552 towns 4 are home to just over
fifty percent of the state’s entire population of 10.7 million. 5
However, the unincorporated areas of North Carolina’s one hundred
counties (“from Dare to Cherokee”) are home to almost as many people. 6
The people living in unincorporated areas of North Carolina’s counties are
almost as dependent on the neighboring municipalities as those who live
inside the town boundaries. 7 Non-municipal residents travel to incorporated
municipalities to work, receive government services, purchase essentials, or
seek out entertainment. 8
Some even view the area just outside of town limits as the most
desirable place to live. 9 Such locations offer the conveniences of a town
while allowing residents to maintain a rural lifestyle and avoid higher
municipal taxes.10 Others reside in the area just outside of a town because it

1. Jonah Kaplan, Deals or Disagreements? What To Expect in NC General Assembly’s New
Session with a Divided Government, ABC11 (Jan. 9, 2019), https://abc11.com/politics/deals-ordisagreements-whats-on-the-table-for-nc-general-assemblys-new-session/5041877/
[https://perma.cc/SP7S-2R6Z]; Wiley J. Williams, “Manteo to Murphy,” NCPEDIA (2006),
https://www.ncpedia.org/manteo-murphy [https://perma.cc/5DFJ-TXYW].
2. How
NC
Cities
Work,
NC
LEAGUE
MUNICIPALITIES,
https://www.nclm.org/advocacy/how-nc-cities-work [https://perma.cc/7DX-T8BJ].
3. North Carolina Municipalities Ranked by the June 1, 2016 Estimated Population, OFF.
ST. BUDGET & MGMT., https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/demog/rankedbysizesmallest_2016.html
[https://perma.cc/848P-J67B].
4. This Comment will use the terms town, city, and municipality interchangeably
throughout.
5. Estimates of Municipal and Non-Municipal Populations of North Carolina and North
Carolina Counties for July 1, 2016: Standard Population Estimates, N.C. OFF. ST. BUDGET &
MGMT., https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/demog/muninonmunipop_2016.html [https://perma.cc/P7MJ2CHT].
6. Id. (identifying the non-municipal population of the state as forty-four percent of the
entire state’s population).
7. See Nathan Arnosti & Amy Liu, Why Rural America Needs Cities, BROOKINGS (Nov.
30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-rural-america-needs-cities/ [https://perma.cc/
F7C7-Q2EL].
8. See id.
9. Joe Cortright, Are Americans Fleeing Cities for Suburbs? Not So Fast, CITYLAB (June
11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/06/are-americans-fleeing-cities-for-suburbs-not-sofast/562580/ [https://perma.cc/MH7C-FJ8B] (explaining that the growth of suburbs often
outpaces growth of their related urban areas).
10. See The Differences Between City, Suburban, and Rural Living, PROP. MGMTT, INC.
(Feb.
2,
2018),
https://www.rentpmi.com/blog/2018/02/02/the-differences-between-citysuburban-and-rural-living/ [https://perma.cc/X8HN-GSQ4].
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is the only place they can afford. 11 For some, the areas just outside of
municipalities are where their communities have lived for over a century. 12
While non-municipal residents may live near the city, they are not
technically considered part of the city. 13 They do not live there, so they do
not vote there.14
Unincorporated residents look to the county as their primary
representative. 15 The county often takes on the responsibility of rendering
services akin to those provided by a municipality, such as sewer and water
services, building inspections, and planning for the county’s
unincorporated areas.16 Such services supplement those the county provides
to all its residents—including those who live inside of municipalities—such
as the administration of welfare programs and the county school district. 17
Despite neither living inside the town nor voting there, many semiurban residents of North Carolina might be surprised to learn that if they
want to do anything with their property, they must apply for zoning permits
with the neighboring town rather than with the county zoning office, the
government office that ordinarily meets every other need for
unincorporated county residents.18
The people who live outside a town’s boundaries but have their landuse planning and zoning determined by that town are residents of the
town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”).19 Residents living in the ETJ do
not vote for the town’s elected leaders and do not have political means

11. Id.
12. Daniel T. Lichter et al., Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in
Small Southern Towns, 72 RURAL SOC. 47, 49 (2007) (discussing the concentration of black
Americans in the Rural South outside the borders of established municipalities).
13. Id. at 50.
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (“[E]ach city shall be governed by a mayor and a
council of three members, who shall be elected from the city at large. . . .”).
15. Basics of North Carolina County Government, N.C. CTR. FOR COUNTY RES.,
http://www.ncacc.org/DocumentCenter/View/1094/White-Paper-Basics-of-North-Carolina-CountyGovernment?bidId= [https://perma.cc/A67A-BRC9].
16. Id. Every North Carolina resident resides in one of the state’s one hundred counties. Id.
The county residents who do not live in city limits have only one local government office to look
to: the county government. Id. Those residents living in municipalities have two different local
government representatives: their town government and their county government. D AVID W.
OWENS, THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE WITH MUNICIPAL EXTRATERRITORIAL P LANNING
JURISDICTION 3 (2006) [hereinafter OWENS, EXPERIENCE], https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/
www.sog.unc.edu/files/additional_files/ss20.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K95-NMB4]. In North
Carolina, counties and municipalities only have governing authority that has been delegated to
them by the North Carolina General Assembly. How NC Cities Work, supra note 2.
17. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 1.
18. DAVID W. OWENS, LAND USE L AW IN NORTH C AROLINA 30 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter
OWENS, LAND USE L AW].
19. Id.
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other than speaking at public hearings; thus, they have little recourse to
influence the zoning decisions made about their property. 20
A town can make zoning and construction decisions about an ETJ
without accountability to the ETJ residents. For example, the town council
in Mebane, North Carolina, approved plans to route a new highway through
West End, a community in Mebane’s ETJ, to avoid affecting town
residents’ property values (and therefore the town’s tax base). 21 The ETJ
residents in West End did not have any political power to hold the town
officials accountable for this decision. 22
The justifications offered for allowing towns to exercise their zoning
power outside of their borders seem reasonable at first glance. For one,
municipalities were presumed to have a justifiable interest in the areas just
outside of their boundaries. 23 Because the areas just outside town borders
are what people see first when entering the town, logically, towns have an
interest in maintaining the appearance and development of these areas.24
Essentially, the ETJ was justified to prevent the development of shanty
towns on the outskirts of municipalities because the town did not want
visitors to see undesirable land uses.25
Second, exercising zoning power outside town boundaries gives
municipalities the ability to control development outside of the town’s
borders as the town population grows. 26 When the statute granting ETJ
authority to all municipalities became law, North Carolina’s population
was growing steadily, and that growth was relatively evenly distributed
across the state. 27 If North Carolina’s towns were growing, then it was
reasonable to assume that towns were going to outgrow current boundaries
and need to expand. 28 But haphazard expansion would not have been
healthy growth for the state, so the General Assembly presumed that this
20. Id.
21. Danielle Purifoy, A Place Called Mebane, SCALAWAG (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/2016/08/a-place-called-mebane/
[https://perma.cc/BM5DUK7F].
22. See id. (“The city’s boundaries stretch around their homes and even bisect their streets,
but never in the over 100 years since emancipated Blacks settled on these lands has the City of
Mebane incorporated them into its polity. They can neither vote in municipal elections nor run for
public office. And yet, Mebane controls their land for up to three miles outside the city limits.”).
23. JOSEPH M. HUNT, JR., ET AL., NORTH C AROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT S TUDY COMMISSION 18 (1958) [hereinafter HUNT, MUNICIPAL
REPORT].
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. North Carolina Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV. (Apr. 1, 2019),
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/north-carolina-population/
[https://perma.cc/C7PL8JAT].
28. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 23.
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growth could be planned by giving municipalities the authority to zone
outside of the town boundaries.29
This Comment will concentrate on the second concern raised by the
state’s municipalities—that of organized growth. Residents’ interest in
external perceptions of their town is complex enough to deserve its own
analysis, especially considering differing cultural perceptions for land
development. The scope of this Comment is limited, therefore, to the ETJ
as it relates to the growth of municipalities.
For many North Carolina municipalities, the growth that occurred in
the mid-twentieth century has reversed into population decline. While
growth in the state overall has continued, it is concentrated in an
increasingly small number of areas (e.g., the greater Charlotte area, the
Triangle,30 and the Triad31).32 Though municipal growth may not be as
concentrated as it once was,33 thirty-four counties in the state experienced a
decrease in the rate of growth between 2016 and 2017. 34
While many municipalities have seen population growth level off,
they have also lost the ability to grow their boundaries on their own terms.
The General Assembly passed the ETJ statute in 196035 with growth in
mind, and a majority of current municipal officials say that they intend to
annex the area that the town is regulating via ETJ. 36 However, forcing
annexation of these areas has become fiscally problematic because of a
major change in the state’s annexation statute that occurred in 2011.37
Towns are now practically limited to growing boundaries because it must
assume some of the cost of annexation. 38 This could result in a number of

29. Id.
30. North Carolina’s Research Triangle is composed of Chapel Hill, Durham, and Raleigh.
Research Triangle Park, NCPEDIA (2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/research-triangle-park
[https://perma.cc/R98L-T4KR].
31. North Carolina’s Piedmont Triad is made up of Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and High
Point.
About
the
Region,
PIEDMONT
TRIAD
REGIONAL
COUNCIL,
https://www.ptrc.org/about/about-the-region [https://perma.cc/V4TD-BMW3].
32. See Rebecca Tippett, Are NC County Growth Patterns Shifting?, CAROLINA
DEMOGRAPHY,
https://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2018/03/22/are-nc-county-growth-patternsshifting/ [https://perma.cc/R3FW-WBH7] (stating that thirty-four of North Carolina counties
experienced negative growth between 2016 and 2017).
33. Id. (“During the first half of the decade, more than half (53%) of the state’s growth
occurred in one of three counties: Wake, Mecklenburg, and Durham.”)
34. Id.
35. Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (2017)).
36. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 10.
37. Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A).
38. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 160A-58.56(b) (2017).
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ETJ communities being left in planning and development limbo with no
end in sight.
Some argue that communities left in ETJs function as dumping
grounds for municipalities’ undesirable land uses while not being able to
participate in the town governance that regulates land use and development
planning.39
This Comment will proceed in three parts to address: (1) why are
many ETJ communities unlikely ever to be annexed by the town that
regulates them; (2) are these communities actually being harmed by the use
of ETJs; and (3) how can communities that no longer wish to be regulated
by a neighboring town remedy their situation?
Part I will provide a summary of the ETJ and annexation legislation to
demonstrate that, when these statutes were passed in 1959 and 1960, they
were intended to focus on municipal growth. It will then show that the
annexation reforms passed in 2011 and 2012 by the newly elected and
Republican-controlled state government40 disrupted the intent of these
statutes by making annexation more difficult. When considered with the
fact that small-town growth is not proceeding as it has in the past, this
means that many North Carolina residents are stuck in a neighboring
town’s ETJ and will most likely never be annexed into the city limits.
Part II will examine the theorized negative consequences of living in
an ETJ. Publicly available data and research by advocacy organizations
suggests that many theorized negative consequences might be
overexaggerated. The data also reveals that some ETJ communities are not
receiving water and sewer services while communities within the municipal
boundaries and communities outside of the ETJ are. But even in
communities where a concentration of undesirable land uses does not exist,
residents may still feel disenfranchised when they learn that decisions are
made for them by people they did not directly elect because county
residents have the right to vote for only county commissioners and on
matters of county concern.
Part III will describe what options ETJ residents in North Carolina
have if they no longer want to be in the ETJ. This part will first look at
what options already exist and will primarily focus on the available
annexation pathways for ETJ residents. The annexation reforms of 2011
created new pathways for distressed areas to force annexation, but
annexation is not the answer for all. There are no statutory paths for ETJ
39. Purifoy, supra note 21, at 18.
40. GOP Takes Control of State Legislature, WRAL (Nov. 3, 2010),
https://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8556651/ [https://perma.cc/VTN4-6GEB] (stating
that the North Carolina Republican “party had seized control of the state General Assembly for
the first time in more than a century”).
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residents that might wish to be released from the ETJ without being
annexed into the town. Finally, this part will then propose some possible
changes to the ETJ statute that would give landowners more of a voice in
the zoning and land-use planning decisions that are made about their
property.
I. WHY ARE MANY ETJ COMMUNITIES UNLIKELY EVER TO BE ANNEXED
INTO THE TOWNS THAT ARE REGULATING THEM?
The areas surrounding a town are regulated by two statutes: the ETJ
statute41 and the annexation statute. 42 The state started with granting towns
zoning powers and then granting general ETJ zoning and annexation
powers.43
A.

History of Zoning and Early Efforts to Zone Outside of Town
Boundaries

Zoning laws resulted from a perceived need for a town to control the
development that was taking place within its borders.44 These laws
typically divide a municipality into districts and regulate the types of
buildings and uses that are allowed to occur in that district. 45 Zoning laws
were held to be constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,46 which
allowed municipalities to enact laws that determine how a landowner can
and cannot use his land. 47 Through the mid-nineteenth century, zoning
became more and more common until it became the norm for
municipalities to have zoning ordinances in place. 48
In North Carolina, the legislature initially granted zoning authority to
a municipality on a case-by-case basis.49 The General Assembly finally

41. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State,
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(e)),
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(b) (2017), repealed by Act
to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019
N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (2017).
43. See id.
44. See Amanda Erickson, The Birth of Zoning Codes, a History, CITYLAB (June 19, 2012),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2012/06/birth-zoning-codes-history/2275/ [https://perma.cc/V7SDDWEW].
45. See OWENS, LAND USE L AW, supra note 18, at 13.
46. 272 U.S. 365, 390–95 (1926) (holding that a zoning ordinance must be clearly
unreasonable before it can be declared unconstitutional).
47. Id.
48. OWENS, LAND USE L AW, supra note 18, at 15.
49. Id. at 16.
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granted general zoning powers to North Carolina municipalities in 1923. 50
As municipal governments enacted zoning laws within town boundaries, a
few towns tried to exercise control over the areas outside of municipal
limits.51
For instance, the town of Washington, North Carolina, tried to
regulate the dumping of fish into its water source that was occurring
outside of the town limits.52 In State v. Eason,53 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that a city is permitted to regulate only what the state
legislature has authorized it to regulate, and Washington had not been
granted authority to regulate the dumping of fish on the other side of the
river.54
The court explicitly noted in this case that if the legislature granted
this power to Washington, then there would be nothing inherently
unconstitutional about the town exercising the power despite the fact that it
would be acting outside of its territorial limits. 55
Later, the legislature began to grant certain municipalities the power
to regulate beyond their borders. 56 The legislature granted Greensboro the
power to regulate sanitation for up to a mile outside of its boundaries. 57
This grant of power survived a court challenge in State v. Rice, confirming
the power of the state legislature that the court established in State v.
Eason.58
50. Act to Empower Cities and Towns to Adopt Zoning Regulations, ch. 250, 1923 N.C.
Sess. Laws 572, 572–76.
51. See, e.g., State v. Eason, 114 N.C. 787, 787–97, 19 S.E. 88, 88–91 (1894).
52. Id. at 795–96, 19 S.E. at 90–91.
53. Id. at 787, 19 S.E. at 88.
54. Id. at 795–96, 19 S.E. at 90–91.
55. Id. at 792, 19 S.E. at 89. (“[T]he legislature unquestionably had the power to extend the
jurisdiction of the town, for police purposes, to the middle of the river or to the opposite bank;
and had the line been described as crossing the other side when it reached the river, and running
thence along that shore to a point opposite the beginning, thence to the beginning, the effect
would have been to extend the boundary for the exercise of the power to prohibit nuisance,
delegated to the town, across the adjacent bed of the river, while the territorial limit of its
authority for all purposes other than the exercise of police powers would have been the low-water
mark on the north bank.”).
56. See State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 635, 74 S.E. 582. 582 (1912) (discussing the charter of
Greensboro, in which the General Assembly provided that all ordinances of the city enacted “in
the exercise of police powers given to it for sanitary purposes or for the protection of the property
of the city, shall apply to the territory outside of the city limits within one mile of same in all
directions”); OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 6 (stating that the General Assembly granted
Raleigh, Chapel Hill, Gastonia, and Tarboro the power to adopt zoning ordinances in the one-mile
area surrounding their municipal limits).
57. See 158 N.C. at 635, 74 S.E. 582, 582.
58. Id. at 638, 74 S.E. 582, 583 (“The question is not how the city authorities are chosen, but
what power the Legislature has conferred upon them over adjacent districts beyond the city limits
in which may be set up establishments, businesses, or other things which would be injurious to
the health of its people.”).
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The legislature then began to grant the general zoning power to a
handful of municipalities to help address growing populations.59 In 1949,
the towns of Raleigh, Chapel Hill, Gastonia, and Tarboro were all granted
the power to adopt zoning ordinances in the one-mile area surrounding
municipal limits.60
A decade later, the General Assembly created the Municipal
Government Study Commission (“Commission”) to examine the
difficulties that municipalities were experiencing related to growth and
expansion.61 The resulting report recognized that all towns have a
significant interest in the land that borders municipality limits and made
recommendations for the establishment of an extraterritorial zoning statute
that granted, writ large, the authority to all municipalities of a certain size
to enact zoning ordinances for the areas outside municipal boundaries. 62
The resulting statute is discussed in detail below, but it by and large
incorporated the recommendations of the study report and granted ETJ
authority to municipalities.63
The report emphasized that towns have a “special interest in the areas
immediately adjacent to their limits. These areas, in the normal course of
events, will at some point be annexed to the city bringing with them any
problems growing out of their chaotic and disorganized development.” 64
The statute emphasized that the decision as to what areas to zone outside
the town limits must be based on “existing or projected urban development
and areas of critical concern to the city as evidenced by officially adopted
plans for its development.”65 The report and the statute, while
acknowledging that there were exceptions to this rule, emphasized that,
overall, the tool of ETJ zoning should be used as a means for planning the
growth of urban areas. 66
59. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 6.
60. Id.
61. See HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at Introductory Letter; JOSEPH M. HUNT,
JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT S TUDY COMMISSION, NORTH C AROLINA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT at Introductory Letter (1959) [hereinafter H UNT,
SUPPLEMENT].
62. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18; see Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204,
§ 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2
(2017)).
63. See infra Section I.B.
64. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18.
65. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the
State, ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-22(e)), https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(b) (2017), repealed by Act
to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019
N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
66. See id.; HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18.
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Recognizing the problematic nature of simply planning for future
growth without a plan for what to do with urbanized areas once they have
developed, the Commission requested a study on how municipalities
should proceed with annexing areas that have developed or will develop.67
Subsequently, the Commission published a supplement to its ETJ report
focused almost exclusively on annexation. 68 Specifically, a memo
summarizing the reports and resulting legislation written by George Esser
(who served as staff to the Commission) emphasized that annexation could
not be the only solution to a growing urban area’s problems. 69 Instead, the
memo said that annexation must be considered with planning proposals,
such as the ETJ power, to work towards sound urban growth. 70 The ETJ
and annexation statutes passed in the late 1950s were intended to work
together toward sound urban development. 71
B.

The ETJ Statute

The ETJ statute, passed by the General Assembly in 1960, has not
changed much since its initial passage. Section 160A-360 provides that all
municipalities have the power to zone within “a defined area extending not
more than one mile beyond its limits.” 72 In addition to this initial grant of
power, the statute allows towns of larger populations to extend this area up
to three miles with the approval of the county that has jurisdiction over the
area.73 If a county is already zoning the area then the town cannot extend its
zoning authority into it. 74 Furthermore, a property owner who has acquired

67. See HUNT, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 61, at 5.
68. See generally id. (discussing issues relating to annexation and the impact of legislative
changes on annexation).
69. See GEORGE H. ESSER, JR., STAFF MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR THE MUNICIPAL
STUDY COMMISSION 64–65 (1958), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/
reports/mgsc-1958%20esser%20memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLH6-KYX9].
70. See id. at 75.
71. George H. Esser, Jr., Legislation of Interest to Municipal Officials, POPULAR GOV’T,
June 1959, at 14 (describing “package of bills” including both ETJ and annexation legislation as
“designed to meet the challenges of urban growth”).
72. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State,
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160D-2-1(a), 2-2(a) to (b)), https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019111.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(a) (2017),
repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the
State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
73. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160D-2-1(a), -2-2(a) to
(b)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate,
and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
74. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(c)); see also
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vested rights under a permit prior to the initiation of ETJ retains the ability
to exercise those rights. 75
The statute also requires that, if and when a municipality chooses to
adopt a zoning ordinance for its ETJ, it must give the residents of the ETJ
proportional representation on the planning board.76 This is done by
appointing “at least one resident of the entire extraterritorial zoning and
subdivision regulation area to the planning board of adjustment that makes
recommendations or grants relief in these matters.”77 According to a
University of North Carolina School of Government survey conducted in
2004–2005, sixty-two percent of responding municipalities utilized the ETJ
power in some way. 78
Challenges to the ETJ power by ETJ residents have mostly failed due
to lack of standing. 79 So far, any successful challenges to the exercise of
ETJ power have succeeded only because of the town’s failure to follow
proper procedure to establish an ETJ.80 Courts have continually upheld the
right of the state to grant the ETJ power to a municipality and the rights of
municipalities to exercise it as long as it complies with the statute.81
C.

The Original Annexation Statute

After decades of expanding municipal boundaries on a case-by-case
basis, North Carolina’s 1947 annexation statute allowed annexation to be

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(e) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize
the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
75. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(k)); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(i) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize
the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
76. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
77. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
78. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 9.
79. See, e.g., Templeton v. Town of Boone, 208 N.C. App. 50, 54–56, 701 S.E.2d 709, 713–
14 (2010).
80. See, e.g., Town of Swansboro v. Odum, 96 N.C. App. 115, 117, 384 S.E.2d 302, 302
(1989); Town of Lake Waccamaw v. Savage, 86 N.C. App. 211, 215, 356 S.E.2d 810, 812
(1987).
81. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 619, 227 S.E.2d 574, 582 (1976);
Macon County v. Town of Highlands, 187 N.C. App. 752, 758, 4 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2007); Town of
Green Level v. Alamance County, 184 N.C. App. 665, 675, 646 S.E.2d 851, 857 (2007); Bryan v.
Raynor, 94 N.C. App. 91, 98, 379 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1989).
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initiated by the city with no input from the to-be-annexed landowners.82
Some considered this legislation a failure, however, because it required a
level of legislative intervention. 83 The general assembly passed a new, more
comprehensive annexation statute in 1959.84
Though small changes were made to this statute between 1959 and
2010, it was still recognizable until the Annexation Reform Act of 2011. 85
To explain how the Annexation Reform Act altered the previous
annexation legislation, the following paragraphs will analyze the
annexation statute as it was codified in the 2009 North Carolina General
Statutes.86
The 2009 annexation statute noted that sound urban development is
essential to economic development and that municipal boundaries should
extend to include areas intensively used for residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional, or governmental purposes to provide high-quality
services needed therein for public health, safety, and welfare. 87 Along with
these greater policy goals, the statute regulated towns of five thousand
people or fewer differently than towns of greater than five thousand.88
Under this annexation statute, a municipality could not annex land
unless the land had been developed for “urban purposes.” 89 “Urban
purposes” was defined by what percentage of the land to be annexed, at the
time, was used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or
governmental purposes.90 In addition, cities of more than five thousand

82. See INST. OF GOV’T, UNIV. OF N.C. CHAPEL H ILL, 1947 LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY:
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH C AROLINA 25–26 (1947).
83. Frayda S. Bluestein, The Development of North Carolina’s Annexation Legislation: The
1947 Legislation, UNC SCH. GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/resource-series/development-northcarolina’s-annexation-legislation-1947-legislation [https://perma.cc/Z8RM-FFRU]. The legislature
was still spending a substantial amount of time on special annexation legislation for individual
cities to expand their boundaries. Id.
84. Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (2017)).
85. See generally Act to Reform Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (revising North Carolina’s annexation statute).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2009), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1694, 1667–70.
87. Id. § 160A-33, repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649.
88. Id. (stating that towns with populations greater than five thousand people were given
greater annexation powers than towns of less than five thousand because it was presumed that
towns with larger populations were growing at faster rates), repealed by Act to Reform the
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649.
89. Id. § 160A-36(c), repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649.
90. See id.
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people could annex an undeveloped area (i.e., non-urban area) if it lies
between the municipal limits and an area developed for urban purposes. 91
This statute also allowed for two different methods of annexation:
voluntary or involuntary. 92 Voluntary annexation by petition allowed
property owners, regardless of whether the land had been developed for
urban purposes, to present a petition to the appropriate board signed by
every single property owner in the relevant area, asking for the
municipality to annex their land.93 The town was permitted to annex this
area but not required to do so.94
Under this annexation statue, towns could also initiate and complete
involuntary annexation, even over land where property owners did not want
to be annexed by the town. 95
D.

How the ETJ Statute and Annexation Statutes Initially Worked
Together

The same legislature passed both North Carolina’s ETJ statute and
annexation statute in response to the report by the Commission and
intended the statutes to work together. In at least a majority of instances,
planning officials intended for ETJs to be related to future annexations. 96
The logic of the two statutes jibes easily. A municipality should have
the ability to plan ahead for annexation by exercising some control over the
areas it plans to annex. A study conducted by the UNC School of
Government supports this contention, reporting that two-thirds of
responding municipalities intended the area they were regulating by ETJ to
be annexed in the future. 97
The powers that a municipality had prior to the annexation reform
allowed it to act on this plan. 98 Changes to the annexation statute made by
the 2011–2012 state legislature foiled any possible cooperation between the
91. Id. § 160A-48(d), repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649.
92. See id. § 160A-31(a), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of
North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70; see also Daren Bakst,
Forced Annexation, JOHN LOCKE FOUND., https://johnlocke.org/site-docs/research/
2011issueguide/18forcedannexation.html [https://perma.cc/Z8Q4-6834].
93. Bakst, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 10.
97. Id.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-34, -46 (2011) (granting involuntary annexation authority),
repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, §§ 1, 7,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649; Nolan v. Village of Marvin, 360 N.C. 256, 262, 624 S.E.2d
305, 309 (2006) (upholding power of municipalities to engage in involuntary annexation so long
as the municipality complies with the procedures of the statute).
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statutes. Even if the use of ETJs and future annexation were not tied, the
annexation reforms passed in 2011 effectively erased the ability of towns to
use these tools as the earlier legislature intended. 99
E.

Annexation Reform

The 2010 general election led to a drastic shift in the composition of
the North Carolina General Assembly. 100 The legislature became
significantly more conservative and an emphasis on property rights led to
an overhaul of the state’s annexation statute. 101 There were four significant
changes to the law.
First, the new annexation statute completely eliminated the distinction
between municipalities with populations greater or fewer than five
thousand people.102 This removed a fundamental path to growth that was
available to larger towns before the reform: the ability to include
undeveloped land in an annexation proposal if the land was between the
town boundaries and a developed area that the town sought to annex. 103
Second, the new annexation statute added a referendum requirement
that allows property owners, subject to involuntary annexation, to vote
down the annexation. 104 Municipalities wishing to annex contiguous land
would be required to hold a referendum. If less than half of the affected
population voted in favor of the annexation, it would not move forward. 105
Municipalities were also required to pay for this referendum. 106
99. See Laura Leslie, Annexation Changes ‘Punitive’?, WRAL (May 17, 2012),
https://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/blogpost/11110324/
[https://perma.cc/BPN9-4VJJ]
(reporting that during the passage of the Annexation Reform Act, there were nine forced
annexations under way).
100. GOP Takes Control of State Legislature, WRAL (Nov. 3, 2010),
https://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8556651/
[https://perma.cc/AW4X-9WGS]
(“[T]he [Republican] party . . . seized control of the state General Assembly for the first time in
more than a century.”).
101. See Sarah Burrows, Forced Annexation Could Become History in North Carolina,
CAROLINA J. (May 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/forcedannexation-could-become-history-in-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/S9JM-26W5].
102. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.50 to -58.63 (2017)).
103. Id.
104. Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 19, 19–20 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.64 (2017)).
105. The original Annexation Reform legislation did not require a referendum but rather gave
property owners the ability to deny the annexation by petition. Frayda S. Bluestein, Annexation
Reform: Referendum Replaces Petition to Deny, COATES’ C ANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (June
28, 2012), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/annexation-reform-referendum-replaces-petition-todeny/ [https://perma.cc/QFK6-T52P]. The ability to petition was struck down by a Wake
County Superior Court Judge as unconstitutional. Id. The legislature responded by changing the
petition to a referendum requirement in 2012. Id.
106. Id.
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Third, the new statute required that if a municipality planned to
provide water and sewer service to an annexed area—which it is required
to do if it is providing water and sewer service within the existing town
limits—it must build the connecting lines free of charge to each residence
that wishes to participate. 107 Previously, when towns provided newly
annexed properties with access to these services, the individual land owners
were responsible for connecting to the city-owned lines and paying for that
connection.108 Now, municipalities not only have to pay for the main line
but must also provide the individual hookups to the line free of charge. 109
This significantly increased the potential cost of any involuntary
annexation.110 Furthermore, the statute required that the connecting lines be
completed within three-and-a-half years of the annexation.111
Fourth, and most interestingly, the statute gave economically
distressed areas—those where fifty-one percent of the households have an
income less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level—the ability to
require a neighboring town to annex the area by presenting the town with a
petition signed by seventy-five percent of the property owners in the
area.112 In this situation, the town does not have a choice and must annex
the area requesting it. 113 In addition, residents, rather than the property
owners, who live in an economically distressed area can request annexation
with a petition signed by two-thirds of the residents, but the town is not
required to acquiesce to their request in this case. 114 Both of these
annexation methods require fewer signatures than voluntary annexation
under the previous law, which required 100 percent agreement.115
In a blog post published soon after the annexation reforms became
law, Frayda Bluestein, a professor at the UNC School of Government,
detailed the increased costs that a city looking to expand its borders via
involuntary annexation would incur, and she posited that involuntary
annexations would become less common due to cost concerns. 116
107. Frayda S. Bluestein, Annexation Reform: A Summary of the New Law, COATES’
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Aug. 2013), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/annexation-reform-andinteresting-new-proposal-in-the-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/V93Z-FZG2].
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id.; see also Frayda S. Bluestein, Water and Sewer Extensions “At No Cost”—
Analyzing the New Annexation Law, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Aug. 2, 2011),
https://canons.sog.unc.edu/water-and-sewer-extensions-”at-no-cost”-analyzing-the-newannexation-law/ [https://perma.cc/2EYA-JFK3].
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According to an interview with the North Carolina League of
Municipalities,117 the League is unaware of a single involuntary annexation
that has taken place since the passage of the 2011–2012 annexation reform
laws.118
Now that the ETJ and annexation statutes are not able to work
together as originally intended, many ETJ residents who may have
eventually been annexed and provided with city services in exchange for
higher property taxes are now stuck in planning limbo. With the increased
cost of involuntary annexation and the logistical difficulties of voluntary
annexation, some residents may find themselves living permanently in an
ETJ. Part II will examine whether there are detriments to living in an ETJ
without hope of annexation.
II. ARE COMMUNITIES ACTUALLY BEING HARMED BY THE USE OF ETJS?
Many have written about the dangers of living on the urban fringe,
claiming that undesirable land uses are overly concentrated in these areas
and that the harms affect minority and lower-income communities more
than any other. 119
Considering an ETJ as a statutorily defined urban-fringe area, this part
will proceed by examining a series of perceived shortcomings to living in
an ETJ and by using publicly available data and research from the Cedar
Grove Institute and UNC Center for Civil Rights to determine whether
those shortcomings actually exist. Specifically, it will examine four
different shortcomings that are often perceived or assumed about ETJs: (1)
lack of representation in town decisions about ETJ communities, (2) racial
motivation and use of ETJs to isolate minority communities, (3)
disproportionate concentration of undesirable land uses in ETJs, and (4)
lack of government services in urbanized ETJ communities.
A.

Lack of Representation in Town Decisions about ETJ Communities

The first perceived shortcoming with the use of ETJ planning is a lack
of representation of the affected property owners on the board making
117. Who We Are, N.C. LEAGUE MUNICIPALITIES, https://www.nclm.org/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/3GBS-49DM] (“The North Carolina League of Municipalities is a service and
advocacy organization representing nearly every city and town in North Carolina, helping them to
more effectively and efficiently serve their residents.”).
118. Email from Kim Hibbard, Gen. Counsel Emerita, N.C. League of Municipalities, to
Matthew L. Farley, (Jan. 24, 2019, 04:29 EST) (on file with North Carolina Law Review). In
comparison, there were nine annexations taking place when the legislation was passed. Leslie,
supra note 99.
119. See generally Lichter, supra note 12 (discussing the effects of non-municipal residency
on black populations in the South); Purifoy, supra note 21 (discussing the impact of ETJ and
annexation on black communities in North Carolina).
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decisions regarding development plans.120 By definition, property owners in
the ETJ own property that falls outside of the town limits and therefore
those owners, unless they are also currently residing and registered to vote
inside the town limits, are ineligible to vote in town elections. 121 The
relevant election would be the town council or town board that is
responsible for appointing the planning board. The planning board controls
the planning in the ETJ, subject to the final say of the town council or town
board on many types of decisions made by the planning board. 122
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that this additional
representation is not constitutionally necessary because the ETJ residents
actually receive all the representation required by the State Constitution via
the North Carolina General Assembly, the body that granted the power to
the towns to exercise the extraterritorial zoning authority. 123 However, the
ETJ statute requires the planning board to have proportional representation
for affected residents living outside of the town boundaries. If a town has
exercised the ETJ power, there must be at least one ETJ representative on
the planning board even if the ETJ population is not large enough to
proportionally justify a full member on the board. 124 This provision has
even caused some to cite North Carolina’s ETJ statute as an exemplar for
providing representation to residents who live in the ETJ.125 Members
representing the ETJ are appointed by the county commissioners who
represent the ETJ residents. 126

120. See, e.g., Purifoy, supra note 21 (highlighting an example of a municipality with
underrepresented property owners).
121. Municipal Elections, N.C. ST. BOARD E LECTIONS, https://www.ncsbe.gov/elections
[https://perma.cc/R6NF-JUMH] (“Although municipal elections are conducted by county boards
of election, only residents of the municipality are qualified to vote in the election. These voters
must have resided in the municipality for at least 30 days prior to the date of the election.”
(emphasis added)).
122. See OWENS, LAND USE L AW, supra note 18, at 8–9.
123. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 636, 74 S.E. 582, 582 (1912). According to a UNC School
of Government Survey, twenty-four percent of responding cities did not have adequate ETJ
representation. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 12.
124. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State,
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7),
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. S TAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to
Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019
N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
125. Andrew P. Gulotta, Comment, Darkness on the Edge of Town: Reforming Municipal
Extraterritorial Planning & Zoning in Illinois to Ensure Regional Effectiveness &
Representation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 495, 518 (2009).
126. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
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However, there are still a number of shortcomings with this setup.
First, the planning board is not always a board of final decision. 127 Many
board decisions can be reversed or amended by the town council from
which the ETJ residents do not have any recourse.128 Therefore, in instances
where the planning board is merely making a recommendation to the town
council, the ETJ representative on the planning board or board of
adjustment does not have meaningfully more influence over the final
decision than an ETJ resident who is not a member of the planning
board.129
Second, there is no guarantee that the ETJ representative will be
incentivized to advocate effectively for the entire ETJ as opposed to just
the area where the representative lives. There are very few requirements for
who the ETJ representative must be.130 The statute requires only that the
representative be a resident of the ETJ, 131 but the ETJ will often extend
from many different parts of the town boundary into areas that have very
different characteristics. Under the current ETJ statute, there is nothing to
prevent the representative being appointed from a wealthy subdivision that
has purposefully stayed outside of the town limits to avoid property taxes
and would continue to advocate for remaining in the ETJ, even though,
across town, remaining in the ETJ would have a negative effect.132
Also, many county residents may have no incentive to elect county
commissioners who will appoint an ETJ representative that will effectively
advocate for the ETJ. Those living in the county and outside of the ETJ
typically have a desire to constrain city growth so that it does not interfere
with their rural lifestyle while those in the town limits have a desire to push
any undesirable land uses out of town limits. 133 The town residents and the
127. See OWENS, LAND USE L AW, supra note 18, at 9.
128. Id. (stating planning boards and boards of adjustment are often only making a
recommendation to the governing council and are often subject to review).
129. Adam Lovelady, Planning Board Basics, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (July
24, 2013), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/planning-board-basics/ [https://perma.cc/V7UC-ZTQH].
130. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the
State § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
131. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the
State § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —; see also N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed
by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2,
2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 154–67.
133. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, RURAL AND SMALL TOWN P LANNING 77 (Judith Getzels &
Charles Thurow eds., 1979) (“[County] zoning is [an] attempt[] to counterbalance strong, natural
market pressures for converting open space into urban development.”); see also Michael Wheeler,
Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE. J. ON
REG. 241, 243 (1994).
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non-ETJ county residents are thus mutually pushing undesirable uses
toward each other, and it would make sense that the uses congregate in the
ETJ.
Furthermore, there are situations where even a directly elected
member of the local planning authority would not make much of a
difference because there are many small towns in rural North Carolina that
do not have hired planning staff or even a standing planning board or board
of adjustment.134 In many towns where the town clerk is the only town
employee that is easily contacted,135 the county-appointed representative
that is supposed to be the voice of ETJ residents in planning and land use
decisions in both the ETJ and the town itself may not even exist. 136
B.

Racial Motivation and Use of ETJs to Isolate Minority Communities

In the rural South, post-slavery land settlement and migration patterns
often resulted in black communities forming on the periphery of
established white communities.137 Black and other minority citizens were
forced out of developed urban areas into the county jurisdiction where
urban services were not provided. 138 However, these communities were
integral to the functioning of the city as labor and consumer.139
Tools like ETJ, which allow regulation of a specified area without
providing services, are often scrutinized for racial animus or presumed to

134. See A. Fleming Bell, II, The Attorney and the Clerk, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT IN NORTH C AROLINA 231, 242 (Frayda S. Bluestein ed., 2d ed. 2014).
135. See id.
136. See Tod Newcombe, IT Department? In Small-Town Governments, They Rarely Exist,
GOVERNING: T HE S TS. & LOCALITIES (July 2017), http://www.governing.com/columns/techtalk/gov-information-technology-small-governments.html
[https://perma.cc/LAK3-R4CZ]
(detailing how small municipal governments in many states are unable to afford IT departments).
North Carolina statutes do not require towns to establish standing planning boards or boards of
adjustment because the town council is allowed to function as either of these boards if necessary.
See OWENS, LAND USE L AW, supra note 18, at 8. But, in these towns, it is unclear if an ETJ
representative is actually ever involved in planning decisions. See id.at 8–10.
137. ALLAN M. P ARNELL ET AL., THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL SEGREGATION: R ACIAL
UNDERBOUNDING
IN
NORTH
CAROLINA
(2004),
https://www.cedargroveinst.org/
files/regional_underbounding.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6Y8-CZWY].
138. Id. at 1 (“African American neighborhoods are kept just outside of a town’s boundaries,
resulting in lower levels of services, reduced access to infrastructure, and limited or no political
voice in land-use and permitting decisions.”).
139. Sam Roberts, Commuters Nearly Double Manhattan’s Daytime Population, Census
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013, 11:56 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
06/03/commuters-nearly-double-manhattans-daytime-population-census-says/ [https://perma.cc/
7LVA-7Q46 (dark archive)] (finding that commuters nearly double Manhattan’s daytime
population and function as a serious economic force in the city despite not living there).
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be racist in motivation and effect because they predominantly affect Black
communities that developed on the outskirts of towns. 140
Mapping the prevalence of black and other minority communities
being regulated by ETJs, rather than being annexed, is difficult to do
because race mapping is primarily analyzed using census data that does not
account for town or county lines when choosing where to map. 141 But largescale mapping is not necessary to show that ETJs have been used by some
communities to intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against
minority communities because organizations like the Cedar Grove Institute
and the UNC Center for Civil Rights have documented this already.142
The neighborhoods of West End in Mebane and Jackson Hamlet and
Midway in Moore County each provide examples of primarily Black
neighborhoods left in planning limbo by the predominantly White towns. 143
The land around these communities has been annexed and provided with
city services, leaving very little means to advocate for development
because they have no meaningful voting representation in the town. 144
Black neighborhoods are also disproportionately passed over entirely
for annexation. 145 In North Carolina, where satellite annexation is allowed,
municipalities can easily and strategically avoid black communities when
making annexation decisions. Satellite annexation allows towns to annex
noncontiguous pieces of land under certain circumstances, such as a town
annexing a large industrial development. 146 Satellite annexation can allow a
town to annex valuable pieces of property without having to annex areas
that would end up costing the city rather than benefitting it.
The manipulation of town boundaries to exclude black communities
from joining towns and the expansion of towns into white areas to dilute
black votes within the municipality was not uncommon in the latter half of

140. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. R IGHTS, INVISIBLE FENCES: MUNICIPAL UNDERBOUNDING IN
SOUTHERN MOORE
COUNTY,
at
ii
(2006),
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/
civilrights/briefs/invisiblefencesreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LCV-5J6A].
141. Racial data is recorded at its smallest level in census block groups that can be relatively
large. Using census block groups to determine whether people of different race or ethnic groups
are living inside or outside of an ETJ would be imprecise. For an example, see 2010 Census—
Census Block Map (Index): Alamance County, N.C., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/dc10map/GUBlock/st37_nc/county/c37001_alamance/DC10
BLK_C37001_000.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK2B-XPCL].
142. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, supra 140, at ii.
143. Id.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (describing the qualification for municipal elections
that require residence within the municipal limits).
145. Lichter, supra note 12, at 59.
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58 (2017); id. 160A-58.1, amended by Act of June 30,
2017, ch. 85, § 3.(b), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 728, 729.
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the twentieth century. 147 The United States Supreme Court, for instance,
reversed a town’s annexation in Gomillion v. Lightfoot148 because it
determined that the town’s purpose was explicitly to exclude black citizens
from becoming part of the town. 149
In reaction to Gomillion, and to further counteract this trend, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 150 contains a provision that requires the U.S.
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) approval for annexation across the South
to prevent the dilution technique from being used; the DOJ, however, has
rarely struck down an annexation.151 This was known as preclearance. In
certain counties with a demonstrated history of segregation, certain policies
that had discriminatory potential required preclearance. Now, DOJ
preclearance is no longer required because Shelby County v. Holder152
undercut this section of the Voting Rights Act. 153
Though infrequent, there are documented examples of established
white communities having complete planning control over historically
black communities but providing no services to those communities in
return. In Silver City, which is a predominantly black community in Hoke
County, North Carolina, all the planning decisions are made by the town of
Raeford, a predominantly white community.154 Three black communities in
the ETJ of Mebane, North Carolina, have been excluded from Mebane’s
annexed growth while having to deal with the difficulties of urban

147. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 1; see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities
Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1104
(2008) (citing Daniel T. Lichter et al., Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial
Exclusion in Small Southern Towns, 71 RURAL SOC. 47, 63–65 (2007)) (“Towns with
predominantly white populations were much less likely to annex black unincorporated areas, even
with statistical controls on the size of the black fringe population.”).
148. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
149. Id. at 347.
150. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42
U.S.C.).
151. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 2–3.
152. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
153. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 529 (“It’s failure to act leaves us today with no choice
but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis
for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”). For an example of how states have interpreted this,
see TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HANDBOOK FOR MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS 31 (2017),
https://www.tml.org/DocumentCenter/View/66/2017-Handbook-Mayors-Council-Members-PDF
[https://perma.cc/QNS3-YWJZ] (providing an update from the Texas Municipal League advising
their members that Section V preclearance is no longer required for annexations).
154. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 5.
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density.155 Monroe Town and Jackson Hamlet in Moore County are other
examples.156
Whether or not the decisions made by municipalities in annexing or
extending ETJs are racially motivated, these annexation decisions
sometimes end up having a racially disparate impact. 157 ETJs are creating
pockets of poverty that are harder to redevelop, and those affected by this
policy in rural North Carolina are predominantly black.
C.

Disproportionate Concentration of Undesirable Land Uses in ETJs

Pieces written about the negative effects of ETJ zoning often presume
that undesirable land uses will be disproportionately concentrated in the
ETJ area.158 The reasoning behind this presumption makes sense; incentives
are aligned for town residents to push undesirable land uses outside of their
borders while county residents will push those same land uses back towards
the town to maintain the character of their communities.159
But what are undesirable land uses? Typically, undesirable land uses
are those that will have some sort of negative impact on the people living
and working in the surrounding areas, including noise, odor, and light
emissions, or simply displeasing to the eye. 160 Some examples of
undesirable land uses include power plants, heavy industry, waste water
treatment plants, confined animal feeding operations, and adult
entertainment.161
It would not be surprising that some of these undesirable uses might
end up congregated on the outskirts of an urban area—that is, in the ETJ—
considering that undesirable land uses are disproportionately sited in

155. See id. The ETJ communities surrounding Mebane, North Carolina, live at a density
where septic systems are failing, resulting in contaminated well water and another section was
rezoned to a manufacturing zoning class without ETJ resident input. Id.
156. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 140, at 1.
157. See generally Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that laws are
constitutionally valid even if they have a racially disparate impact so long as the law was not
passed with a racial animus).
158. See Anderson, supra note 147, at 1152–53 (“The risk that unincorporated areas will bear
a disproportionate share of regional land-use burdens is compounded by the fact that many states
have conferred extraterritorial powers on cities, an exception to the general rule that borders
define the limits of local government authority.”).
159. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 77; see also Wheeler, supra note 133, at 243.
160. See Daniel Kevin, “Environmental Racism” and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A
Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 121 (1997)
(listing hazardous waste facilities, solid waste disposal sites, and contaminated industrial sites as
undesirable land uses).
161. See id.; Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!” Model Legislative Efforts to
Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 147, 172 n.129
(2015).
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minority communities. 162 Those in the urban setting might not want these
uses to take up their valuable living space or pollute their quality of life.
These urban residents could pressure their representatives (on the town
council or the planning board) to focus development of necessary but
sometimes harmful uses as far away from the urban center of living but still
close enough to be useful to these residents. 163
County residents living outside of the ETJ will apply similar pressures
for some of the uses. 164 County residents often want to maintain the rural
environment they enjoy and pressure their elected representatives on the
board of county commissioners to push development of undesirable land
uses towards the urban areas via county planning and development
policies.165
If these two pressures functioned as theorized, then all undesirable
land uses should end up near the urban fringe with a good number falling in
ETJs.
However, the claim that political will is the sole determinant for siting
undesirable land uses has not necessarily been borne out by research, likely
given that data to assess this claim is not well documented. I sought to test
this claim by pulling from public data sets, including: (1) wastewater
treatment plants, (2) sewer water treatment plants, (3) fossil fuel burning
power plants, (4) landfills, (5) major source of air pollution, and (6)
industrial waste sites.166 Unfortunately, the existing databases are often
incomplete or do not clearly or precisely identify the location of
geographical and historical boundaries of undesirable land uses.167 The lack
162. See Kevin, supra note 160, at 123–25.
163. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 133, at 243.
164. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 77.
165. See, e.g., HEATHER BALLASH, KEEPING THE RURAL VISION 23 (1999),
http://mrsc.org/getmedia/2ff2491c-e490-49e8-9bb4-6c4aa197514d/RuralDevelopmentPlanning.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6KFD-EY3H] (highlighting an example where rural residents “protect[ed] rural
character”).
166. See, e.g., Active Permitted Landfills Map, N.C. ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://deq.nc.gov/active-permitted-landfills-map
[https://perma.cc/JMW7-S36H];
Inactive
Hazardous Sites Map, N.C. ENVTL. QUALITY, https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/wastemanagement/waste-management-rules-data/waste-management-gis-maps/ihs-map-viewer
[https://perma.cc/763K-PG4Y]; Maps: Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php [https://perma.cc/T6F8-ERUR]; Sewer Treatment
Plants,
NC
ONEMAP,
http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/
details.page?uuid=%7BF82748A9-C2D2-4B47-B570-BD55462BB6AE%7D [https://perma.cc/
7X8E-M9B9]; Water Distribution Treatment Plants, NC ONEMAP, http://data.nconemap.gov/
geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B96A2BD7C-48BA-4F84-9EE71854C1BD0241%7D [https://perma.cc/FDU4-AVE6].
167. See Active Permitted Landfills Map, supra note 166 (providing pinpoints of locations of
permitted landfills but not their size or geographical boundaries); Inactive Hazardous Sites Map,
supra note 166 (“Disclaimer: NC DEQ staff have compiled this dataset to the best of their
abilities using the resources available to them. NC DEQ neither verifies nor guarantees the
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of both data and research leave this theory as exactly that: a theory. In order
to appropriately address the impact of ETJs on its residents, determining
the answer behind the theory is important. Therefore, further research
should focus on whether undesirable land uses are actually
disproportionately located in ETJs.
D.

Provision of Services

Because ETJ residents live under the control of two regulating
groups—both the county and the town—the ETJ may be ignored by both
the county and town governments because each believes that the other will
take responsibility for the area.168 Because the powers of town governments
and county governments might be listed in different ordinances, each town
may not have the same powers available to it in the ETJ. 169 This means
there is no uniform determination of what power belongs to which entity. 170
This may not be a problem if the ETJ is to be annexed in the near
future. Annexation laws (even prior to the 2011 and 2012 annexation
reforms) require the town to provide the same municipal services to
annexed areas that are provided within the city limits. 171 One of the main
services that is not commonly provided to ETJ residents is water and sewer
services even though some ETJs have a density that makes sewer services a
necessity.172 Dense communities that are zoned for future development but
left in the ETJ, because the annexation statute no longer makes annexation
economically feasible, might thus find themselves in a public health
crisis.173
accuracy, reliability, or completeness of any data provided. NC DEEQ provides this data without
warranty of any kind whatsoever, either express or implied, and shall not be liable for incidental,
consequential, or special damages arising out of the use of any data provided herein.”); see also
Water Distribution Treatment Plants, supra note 166 (providing data of water distribution
treatment plants gathered in 1997 and 2000). Although information about the current locations of
ETJs is available for some counties, see, e.g., Download GIS Data, JOHNSTON COUNTY, N.C.,
http://www.johnstonnc.com/gis2/content.cfm?PD=data
[https://perma.cc/ML9C-W3CU]
(providing ETJ boundaries for Johnston County), existing databases do not have information for
all counties. Furthermore, the imprecise locations of undesirable land uses and the fact that data
for the locations of both ETJs and undesirable land uses are not available for the same time
frames make drawing meaningful conclusions from these data sets very limited.
168. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 11.
169. See id. at 11 n.58.
170. See id.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56 (2017).
172. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137 (“This neighborhood [in Southern Pines’ ETJ] has
neither water nor sewer. The residents petitioned Southern Pines for annexation in order to get
water and sewer. Their request was denied.”); see also id. (highlighting that for involuntary
annexations, municipalities must extend water and sewer lines within two years of annexation).
173. See, e.g., id (“Residents of White Level [a predominately black ETJ community]
requested annexation in 1997 because of problems with their septic tanks, but the town took no
action. Human fecal bacteria attributed to failing septic systems have been found in all three
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Some areas that are outside of a town’s municipal boundary reach a
population density that qualifies as urban under the U.S. Census. 174 In the
past, rural areas have typically been left to their own devices when it comes
to water and sewer planning—often resulting in the use of private wells and
septic tanks.175 But rural counties are finding themselves responsible for
larger and denser populations than ever before and have begun providing
water and sewer services to some parts of their communities in the same
way a municipality would. 176
When a county chooses to provide water and sewer services, it might
target unincorporated urban areas for cost and health reasons. 177 However,
when these unincorporated areas that might require sewer and water
services are in a town’s ETJ, a county may choose to provide services in
other areas because it erroneously believes that it is the responsibility of the
town to provide for these areas. 178
There are several examples throughout the state of counties that
provide water and sewer services for some densely populated areas, but the
county cuts services off right at the ETJ.179 Similarly, the town will provide
water and sewer within the city limits, but the services will not be provided
in the ETJ.180 To illustrate this principle, I have examined data from the
North Carolina OneMap service which completed a thorough study of the
sewer system in each of North Carolina’s 100 counties, using data from
2003. 181
Outside of Goldsboro, North Carolina, Wayne County elected to
provide sewer services to a census-defined urban area that lacked sewer
services.182 Meanwhile, the town of Goldsboro provided sewer services
neighborhoods.”); Purifoy, supra note 21 (showing how these situations can lead to “abandoned
houses, substandard housing, . . . [and a] lack of water and sewer infrastructure”).
174. Anderson, supra note 147, at 1100; Smoothed Urban Boundary, NC ONEMAP,
http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B552ED374BAAB-4F56-B369-DEB93F2E4ABF%7D [https://perma.cc/4QBD-AUN5].
175. See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 181, 191–92.
176. See id. at 181 (describing how suburban areas provide water and sewer services when
on-site services become impossible).
177. See, e.g., Julia Marie Naman & Jacqueline MacDonald Gibson, Disparities in Water and
Sewer Services in North Carolina: An Analysis of the Decision-Making Process, 105 AM. J. OF
PUB.
HEALTH
e20,
e22–e24
(2015),
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/
10.2105/AJPH.2015.302731 [https://perma.cc/2B9B-G3ZU] (describing the conflicts preventing
a county from providing sewer service).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Type A Current Public Sewer Systems, NC ONEMAP GEOSPATIAL PORTAL
http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B5CF6143EF6EA-4420-B18E-054415C3E108%7D [https://perma.cc/HZ4P-USXV].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
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within its boundaries and only to small pieces of the ETJ.183 Thus, large
swaths of the Goldsboro ETJ that are considered urban by the census are
not provided sewer services by either the town or the county. 184 When and
if the county next chooses to provide sewer service, it may not choose to do
so in the ETJ because of the common belief that the ETJ will eventually be
annexed so county resources would be better spent elsewhere. 185
In Nash County, North Carolina, which has a robust county sewer
system, there are ETJ sections considered to be urban around both Rocky
Mount and Nashville that do not receive county sewer services.186 Both
Rocky Mount and Nashville provide sewer to their municipal residents, but
this service stops right at the town line and does not extend into the ETJ. 187
Nash County does provide sewer services to some of the ETJ surrounding
the towns of Bailey and Spring Hope; however, none of these towns or the
ETJs qualify as urban by census standards and are in less need of these
services than those not receiving it because each has not yet reached an
urban density and could use wells and septic tanks rather than public water
and sewer.188
Of course, while there are visible examples of ETJ areas being ignored
for the provision of services by both the municipality and the county, there
are also some counties where urban areas within an ETJ are provided with
water and sewer services. 189 The town of Clayton, a suburb of Raleigh in
Johnston County, has a substantial ETJ, a large portion of which is
considered to be an urban area, and much of that area is provided with
sewer services.190
Because of the uncertainty over the future of ETJ areas, county
governments may not want to spend money to provide water and sewer
services to these communities because they do not know if their investment
will be worth it in the long run. 191 On the other hand, the longer a town
waits to annex and provide services to an ETJ community that needs them,
the worse the problems in the ETJ will become, making it increasingly less
likely that an annexation will ever be initiated by the town considering that
towns are allowed to take cost into consideration when making annexation
decisions.192
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id.
See id.
See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e21–e22.
See Type A Current Public Sewer Systems, supra note 179.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e21–e22.
See id. at e21–e26.
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III. HOW CAN COMMUNITIES THAT NO LONGER WISH TO BE REGULATED
BY A NEIGHBORING TOWN REMEDY THEIR SITUATION ?
While there does not seem to be a single issue plaguing every ETJ in
the state, there are situations where communities are denied water and
sewer services despite density and where the town’s refusal to annex is
racially motivated. 193 A solution must be provided for those who are stuck
in planning limbo. The instinctive answer to an unincorporated urban
community is to have the town annex the community so that it must
provide services. But annexation may not be the appropriate solution in all
or even most situations.
A.

Existing Solutions
1. Annexation

If the primary concern is lack of necessary services—whether because
it causes a lower standard of living or because it prevents the future
economic development of the area 194—annexation might be the appropriate
solution. This tool may in some ways be even more feasible in the wake of
recent policy reforms.
With the changes to the annexation statute making involuntarily
annexation of a property more expensive, the likelihood that communities
in need of services will be annexed at the town’s volition has decreased.195
However, the Annexation Reform Act of 2011 did create a method for
contiguous communities to demand annexation into a municipality, after
which it is required by law for the town to provide services to these new
residents in the same capacity as all other residents.196
However, a community that wishes to be annexed will need to put in
significant work to make it happen. The current annexation statute allows
an adjacent economically distressed area to force annexation by presenting
the municipality with a petition signed by seventy-five percent of the
landowners in that area.197 Seventy-five percent of property owners may
seem like a daunting obstacle, but there is neither an area nor a population
193. See generally UNC C TR. FOR CIVIL R IGHTS, supra 140, at 1, 12–13, 29 (chronicling the
effects of municipal underbounding on minority communities across the state).
194. See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e20 (citing UNC CTR. FOR CIVIL R IGHTS,
supra note 140, at 1–29) (“In addition to health concerns, well and septic system users cite stench,
decreased property value, and high repair costs as adverse effects of relying on self-supplied
systems.”).
195. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2017), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70.
197. Id. § 160A-31(b1), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of
North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70.
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requirement, so very small areas could force annexation by providing
petitions with as few as one signature. For example, a single landowner
who owns land abutting the town boundary that has a household income
below the maximum threshold could, in theory, petition the town for
annexation, and the town would have no choice but to oblige.
Of course, this solution is not perfect. The difficulties of community
organizing and the likelihood of getting such a high percentage of
signatures when annexation might result in higher property taxes could
make these types of annexations difficult to achieve. The most democratic
aspect of this new mechanism to trigger annexation allows the residents—
rather than landowners—to petition for annexation into a municipality.
From a public health perspective, residents will be the ones who are feeling
the effects from lack of services, especially sewer and water services,
where population density might be causing contamination of their water.
While the categories of property owners and residents will often overlap,
this is less and less common.198
Even in the face of a public health concern, property owners who are
not residents may be reluctant to sign a petition that will increase their
property taxes because they will now be taxed by the municipality as well
as the county. But a petition signed by residents rather than property
owners has no compulsory effect; rather it gives the town the option to
annex the property, not dissimilar to the option the town had before the
annexation reforms were ever presented. 199
Property owners may be willing to sign the petition if annexation is
desired to stabilize future economic development by assuring access not
only to town services like sewer and water but also law enforcement or fire
services. Residents—unlike property owners—may be wary of more
investment in the community because it may lead to higher housing costs.
However, even if all landowners and residents in a community wish to be
annexed into a municipality to gain services, this new mechanism is
available only in defined economically distressed areas where fifty-one

198. Millennials (adults currently under forty) are buying homes at rates lower than any
previous generation and are choosing to rent rather than own either because of employment
uncertainty or from lack of access to sufficient credit. See Aaron Hankin, The Real Reasons
Millennials
Aren’t
Buying
Homes,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct.
29,
2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/real-reasons-millennials-arent-buying-homes/
[https://perma.cc/33S9-H6PJ].
199. Compare N.C. GEN S TAT. § 160A-31(a), with id. § 160A-31(j), amended by Act to
Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1649, 1667–70.
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percent of residents in households in the area wishing to be annexed have
an income less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level. 200
For areas that do not meet these criteria but wish to avail themselves
of municipal services, their only other option is to ask the municipality to
initiate an involuntary annexation. Due to the costs the city would have to
incur, this option is unlikely to succeed.
2. Representation
Of course, annexation is not always the solution for landowners who
simply want more control over their own property. Other possible remedies
include more direct representation or setting temporal limits on the control
that a municipality can exercise over its ETJ.
As the law currently stands, the planning board or board of adjustment
must have proportional representation from residents of the ETJ. 201 The
members are appointed by the board of county commissioners rather than
elected by the people of the ETJ whom they will be representing.
Appointed representation historically made sense because planning board
members are usually not elected officials, except in the case where the
town council is serving as the planning board. 202
Electing the member who supposedly represents the interest of the
ETJ residents is a simple solution to the problem of representation on the
boards who decide the fate of ETJs.
Planning boards are composed in any way the community organizing
the board sees fit, 203 possibly meaning that towns and counties could
implement this solution without waiting for the General Assembly to pass a
statute. Though unconventional to elect only one member of the planning
board while the rest of the board is appointed by the town council, it might
be necessary to ensure that these decisionmaking bodies actually have the
interests of their constituents at heart. In the grand scheme of things, it may
simultaneously be better to push these representative boards towards being

200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31(b1) (2017), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70.
201. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State,
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-1),
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-361 (2017), repealed by Act to
Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019
N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
202. See Lovelady, supra note 129.
203. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 160D-3-1); see also N.C.
GEN. S TAT. § 160A-361(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
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more democratic rather than less. While there are no guarantees that the
person elected would have the best interests of every ETJ representative in
mind, with a relatively small voting population it may be possible for a
normally marginalized population to have a stronger voice than it may in
large town elections.
When town residents are displeased by the decisions of the planning
boards, they have the political option to vote in their town elections to elect
new town board members who are responsible for appointing the members
of the planning boards. 204 ETJ residents, by contrast, do not have any
political action they can take other than speaking at public meetings or
writing to representatives who might not even consider ETJ residents to be
their constituents because they cannot vote in municipal elections.205
B.

Proposed Solutions

Simply having a representative on the planning board never truly
solved the representation problem. Because many planning board decisions
are subject to approval by the town board or town council, ETJ residents
remain without meaningful representation on the board of final decision. 206
Additionally, many smaller municipalities do not have standing planning
boards or board of adjustments, but rather form ad hoc committees for each
request that does not fit within the exact letter of the current zoning
ordinance.207
To fully compensate for the lack of representation of ETJ residents in
the planning process, there needs to be a statutory mechanism that requires
municipalities to consider the needs of their ETJ communities.
I propose that this could be done effectively in three different ways:
1. Require ETJ Justification or Rationale
First, the legislature could require that, in every decision the planning
board makes, it must consider and document the effects that the decision
will have on the ETJ. However, this would be a persuasive measure with no
real “teeth.”208 The purpose is to force the decisionmakers to remember that

204. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 160D-3-1); see also N.C.
GEN. S TAT. § 160A-361(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —.
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (describing the qualification for municipal elections
that require residence within the municipal limits).
206. Lovelady, supra note 129.
207. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
208. Persuasive legislation aims to “change people’s behavior by forcing them to think about
the harm they are causing and by publicizing that harm.” James Salzman, Teaching Policy
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decisions regarding planning and development will have an impact on the
ETJ. Hopefully, the decisionmakers will remember that the residents of the
ETJ have no independent means to counter any of the negative planning
impacts on their own. For example, Brunswick County, North Carolina,
requires any municipality that plans to exercise its ETJ to justify it. 209
2. Require ETJ Reevaluation
Second, the statute could mandate reevaluation of the town’s ETJ at
regular intervals. I propose that municipalities be required to reevaluate and
justify their zoning and planning jurisdiction over the ETJ every five years.
This could simply consist of a meeting where the planning staff has
prepared a report about the development status of the land within the ETJ
and whether it is being used effectively to serve the residents of that area. A
majority of responding municipalities in the UNC School of Government
report stated that most considered the ETJ to be a tool prior to future
annexation.210 Annexation has become more difficult after the land reform
bills of 2011 and 2012. 211 Therefore, any report about the current status of
an ETJ area should include an update on plans to incorporate ETJ areas into
their borders and an estimated timeline for this happening.
The planning board should be required to give compelling justification
for retaining planning and development jurisdiction over an area that does
not receive the benefit of town services aside from the proximity to
municipal services. A ten-year timeline would allow the town ample time
to consider long-term planning goals while ensuring that the residents and
landowners are not indefinitely held in an uncertain position. Prior to the
public meeting where the ETJ is being reevaluated, public notice should be
given to both residents and land owners in the ETJ by requiring mailings to
every residence and, if different, the tax bill address for each residence to
make sure that both residents and property owners are able to give their
opinion on staying in the ETJ, being released from the ETJ, or potentially
petitioning for certain areas to be annexed.
Further, at the meeting and in the mailings, the statute should require
the planning board to provide information to the residents and property

Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 363, 373
(2013) (citing Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995)).
209. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 13 (“Brunswick County requires each
municipality requesting extraterritorial jurisdiction to explain its concerns about the area and to
demonstrate its capability and qualifications to provide land use planning, infrastructure planning,
and development regulations in the area.”).
210. See id. at 10.
211. See supra Sections I.D–E.
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owners about the annexation statutes and the ability of these residents or
land owners to request or force annexation via petition.
To make sure this decision is taken seriously, the statute should
include a private right of action for residents and land owners granting
them standing to challenge the decision made at this regular reevaluation of
the ETJ. Any resident or land owner in the ETJ should have the ability to
challenge the decision made on the grounds that it was unreasonable and, if
the Superior Court agrees, 212 to force the planning staff and board to give
more sound reasoning for their decision or possibly reverse it—whether
this decision was to abandon the planning of a property or to retain
planning jurisdiction even when it is not justifiably relevant to the
development of the municipality itself.
The above solutions apply to areas that are already within the ETJ of a
municipality. A prophylactic measure to prevent areas that do not wish to
become part of a municipality’s planning jurisdiction may also be required.
3. Referendum Requirement
Like the annexation reform passed in 2011,213 the General Assembly
could provide a referendum mechanism that allows residents to prevent a
municipality from extending its planning jurisdiction further than it is
currently extended. This would give the residents a chance to prevent
problems potentially caused by the imposition of an ETJ by retaining land
development and planning authority within their elected body, that is, the
county board of commissioners.
This simple change would align with the property rights values of
independence and self-determination that led to the annexation reform in
the first place and would prevent unincorporated communities from being
left in planning limbo where they will be forever regulated by a
municipality that never intends to annex them into the municipality.
The statute could require towns to hold a referendum for all ETJ
residents before the town is allowed to exercise its ETJ power over a new
area. If a majority of voters rejected the expansion of the ETJ in the
referendum, then the town could not exercise its ETJ.

212. See generally DAVID W. OWENS, REVIEW OF L AND USE DECISIONS 5–6 (2017),
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/06%20Review%20of%20
Land%20Use_Owens.pdf [https://perma.cc/FHX4-G7MY] (“[T]he superior court is limited to
review of whether the board [of adjustment] properly affirmed or overruled the officer’s
determination.”).
213. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649–71 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN . STAT. §§ 160A-58.50 to -58.63 (2017)).
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CONCLUSION
The use of ETJs does not always result in hardship for the residents or
property owners of an area on the outskirts of town. Many subdivision
residents who moved into neighborhoods with private trash and sewer
services view residence in a municipal zoning jurisdiction as an asset,
believing it will prevent unwanted land uses in their neighborhoods while
not subjecting them to municipal property taxes.
Although most ETJs burden communities in some ways, the burden
type is not the same across the board. Some may simply feel burdened by a
lack of elected representation. Other communities, especially communities
that are predominately Black or poor, may notice that they are excluded
from town boundaries but are still required to go to the municipality
whenever they want to do something with their own property.
Data shows municipalities that use the tool responsibly to plan for
growth and to promote orderly development on the outskirts of towns
benefit town residents and those living in the ETJ. However, it cannot be
denied that this is a tool that can and has been used improperly and there
should be more options for residents that wish to have more direct control
over their land use planning decisions.
Residents who are stuck in planning and development limbo in the
ETJ of a town that is no longer growing may be ignored in planning and
development decisions. The ETJ may be seen as a convenient area that the
town can zone to develop for the benefit of town residents while ignoring
the effects that it will have on ETJ residents and remaining politically
insulated from the effects of their decision because those ETJ residents are
not able to express their disapproval of town officials at the ballot box.
A simple change to the ETJ statute requiring towns to justify the
exercising of their extraterritorial zoning power every five years would
give ETJ residents a specific time to air their grievances to town officials
which could give ETJ residents a decision that they could challenge in
court as arbitrary and capricious.
When it comes down to it, towns rely on ETJ residents and property
owners to work and shop in their towns almost as much as they do their
own residents and should not be able to take advantage of the fact that ETJ
residents have no political recourse when making planning and zoning
decisions on their behalf.
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